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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

]

CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE
L. RIGBY, Insurance Agent,
Defendants-Respondent.

]
]
>
]
]
]

Docket No. 20582

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Cheryl Hardy, the widow of one
Lynn Hardy, to recover upon an insurance policy issued by The
Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") on her late
husband's life.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint sought to

recover the amount of the policy and other alleged damages from
Prudential (including $30,000,000 in punitive damages) for
denying Mrs. Hardy's claim for insurance benefits (R. at 613-617)
and sought identical damages against Mr. Rigby -- including the
$30,000,000 punitive damages -- for "unfair and deceptive
practices" which never have been defined.

(R. at 615, 617.)
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(Plaintiff has mentioned her claim against Mr. Rigby nowhere in
her Brief -- or, for that matter, in her Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,

(R. at 992-1011.)

The allegations against him, a non-diverse defendant, apparently
never were meant to be taken seriously.)

Prudential denied the

Second Amended Complaint's operative allegations and stated, by
way of defense, that it had been entitled to deny the Hardy claim
by reason of material misrepresentations of medical history and,
further, that Cheryl Hardy was precluded from asserting the
Amended Complaint's demands by her own and her husband's wrongful, inequitable and fraudulent conduct.

(R. at 40-46, 627-633.)

Prudential sued, by Counterclaim, for rescission of the
Hardy policy on grounds of misrepresentations and/or incorrect
statements in the insurance application and fraud.

(R. at

40-46.)
Prudential filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 20, 1984.

(R. at 472-475.)

The Court ordered hearing

on the Motion was postponed until completion of discovery.

(R.

at 622-623.) After discovery had been concluded, the Court heard
arguments on February 15, 1984, a date agreed upon by the parties.

(At that time, discovery had been completed and the case

was set for a bench trial on April 30.

(R. at 663.))

On March

14, 1985, the Court entered Summary Judgment of No Cause of
Action on the Amended Complaint and simultaneously entered Judgment in Prudential's favor on its Counterclaim for rescission.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. at 1143-1144.)

(After the Court had announced its decision,

but before the Judgment's entry, plaintiff filed a "Motion to
Reconsider11; the Court denied that Motion by an Order dated March
20, 1983.

(R. at 1149-1150.))

On April 2, 1985, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal
from the "Judgment of District Court Judge, Dean E. Conder,
entered in the record on March 14, 1985"; she appealed from no
other order.

Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to

review the proceedings on the Motion to Reconsider and plaintiff's evidence on that matter (R. at 1044-1088; PI.. Add, at
30-33, 37-55, 65-76) is not properly part of the record or
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, at pages 2 through 10 of
her Brief and her factual claims elsewhere in the Brief, are
replete with so many misstatements of the record that it is
necessary to reconstruct the case, almost from the ground up.
A.

The Uncontroverted Facts.

Rule 2, Rules of Practice in

the Third Judicial District, requires:
(g) The points and authorities in support
of a dispositive motion shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the movant claims
no genuine issue exists... .
(h) The points and authorities in opposition
to a dispositive motion shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
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material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity to
those portions of the record upon which the
opposing party rely and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of
the movant's facts that are disputed. All
material facts set forth in the statement of
the movant shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment, unless specifically controverted by the statement of the
opposing party.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment contained a
detailed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, as required by the
Rule.

(R. at 673-691.)

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition

to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 1018-1029) did
not respond "specifically" to any of defendant's Statement of
Uncontroverted Facts.

Even construing the statements of plain-

tiff's Memorandum broadly, the following matters' accuracy is not
in dispute.
1.

On August 25, 1981, Lynn Hardy, in applying for a

policy of life insurance with Prudential, was questioned about
his lifelong medical history by Dr. Joseph Evans, Prudential's
examining physician, and concealed, in response to specific
questions, that he had suffered an acute myocardial infarction in
1974, had been diagnosed as suffering from ongoing serious heart
disease (i.e. severe coronary occlusions), had been examined for
heart disease at the University of Utah Medical Center as
recently as 1979, had been examined at the University of Utah
High Risk Coronary Consultation Clinic as recently as 1979, had
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complained of angina pectoris as recently as 1979, and currently
was taking atromid, a cardiovascular medication.

He also con-

cealed the identity of his regular physician, who was a cardiologist.
2.

(R. at 673-675.)
On August 7, 1981, Hardy had made identical conceal-

ments in response to identical questions about his lifelong
history in a paramedical examination for Prudential.
3.

(Ibid.)

On August 10, 1981, Cheryl Hardy, the policy's puta-

tive owner and beneficiary, concealed the same information from
an Equifax investigator, acting on Prudential's behalf, by
claiming that Lynn never had been seriously ill, had not recently
consulted a physician and was taking no regular medication,
although she knew this was untrue.
4.

(R. at 671-677.)

The above statements were untrue and the Hardies

obviously knew so at the time of their representations.

(R. at

677-682.)
5.

If Mr. or Mrs. Hardy had revealed Lynn Hardy's true

medical history -- if only for the five years prior to his application (e.g., Hardy's atromid medication, his records at the High
Risk Coronary Clinic describing his heart attack and angiogram,
his recent angina, etc. (R. at 677-682.)) -- that information
would have revealed or led to the discovery that he was suffering
from a serious heart condition.
6.

Hardy, a truck driver, had habitually concealed his

history of heart disease from medical examiners for the Interstate
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Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation.

(R. at

682.)
7.

Hardy lived in fairly constant fear of recurring

heart trouble and had stated on a number of occasions that he did
not expect to live past forty-five.

(He was forty-two at the

time of his insurance application.)

(R. at 880.)

8.

Even after Lynn Hardy's death, Cheryl Hardy per-

sisted in denying to Richard Stelzner, Prudential's claims
investigator, that Lynn "had a heart problem" and in denying any
knowledge of his earlier heart attack.
9.

(R. at 671-672.)

The only negative data which Hardy's medical history

and examination revealed was that his parents and two of his
fourteen siblings had died of heart attack or stroke and,
according to an electrocardiogram taken by Prudential, he had a
slight (.22 second) first degree arterioventricular ("AV") heart
block.

(R. at 683.)
10.

Hardy's AV heart block was too minor to be ratable

under Prudential's medical guidelines.
11.

(R. at 684.)

Hardy's true history of heart attack, occlusion,

etc. would have revealed that, as of August, 1981, he was suffering from significant heart disease and was in substantially
greater danger of early death than his typical contemporary.
at 684-685.)
12.

The medical history which Hardy provided Pruden-

tial's examiner presented a person manifesting no symptoms of
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(R.

heart disease and in no exceptional danger of early death.
Hardyfs misrepresentations and omissions would have been completely plausible to a physician who had access only to the
information which he provided Prudential in August, 1981.
(R. at 683; Afft. of Robert B. Wray, M.D., R. at 850-853.)
13.

If Prudential had known the true facts of Hardy's

condition, it would have rated him stt least a "Special Class
4" (or ffSP4!f) , which would have entailed a much higher premium
payment ($398.65 a month rather than $161.65 a month).

(R. at

683.)
14.

Prudential accepted Hardy as an unrated risk

because his EKG warranted no debits and his family history, taken
alone, did not warrant sufficient debits for even a Special Class
1 rating.

(R. at 685.)

15.

On August 4, 1981, Cheryl and Lynn Hardy both

signed Part One of the Prudential application for life insurance
which stated:

"No agent can make or change a contract, or waive

any of Prudential's rights or needs.ff
16.

(R. at 683-684.)

The insurance policy which was accepted by the

Hardies in October, 1981, stated:

"Only a Prudential officer may

agree to modify this contract, and then only in writing."

(R. at

684.)
17.
1982.

Lynn Hardy died of a heart attack on December 4,

(R. at 689.)
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18.

Prudential's claims investigator discovered the

true facts of Hardy's medical history, through an inquiry to
Hardy's cardiologist (who was identified on his death certificate
but concealed from his insurance application) and follow-up
inquiries therefrom.
19.

(R. at 689.)

Prudential denied the Hardy death claim on the

ground that information concerning a current heart disease had
been concealed.
20.

(R. at 690.)

Prudential denied coverage on the basis of an

omitted seven-year-old cardiovascular history and successfully
litigated the matter in Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., 432 F.
Supp. 35 (W.D. Va. 1977).

It has denied other claims on the

basis of history more than five years old.
21.

(R. at 690-691.)

Wayne Rigby, Prudential's sales agent, did not

obtain Lynn Hardy's medical history, receive medical reports on
Hardy during the underwriting process nor act as an underwriter
of the policy.

(R. at 678.)

In sum, the Hardies concealed from Prudential's examiners
facts which would have revealed a clearly serious medical condition.
tent:

It is inconceivable that their omissions were inadver-

people just don't "forget11 massive coronary occulusions,

heart medication, recent angina or recent monitoring as high-risk
cardiac patients.
B.

Plaintiff's Factual Allegations.

Plaintiff, in an

attempt to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, has made
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numerous factual allegations in her Brief.

Unfortunately, she

has not complied with UTAH R. of APP. P. 24fs requirement that a
brief separately set forth "a statement of facts relevant to the
issues presented for review" and argument; she has scattered factual assertions throughout her Brief.

Nearly every significant

factual statement in that Brief is untrue and frequently is based
upon incompetent evidence.

The only feasible way to set the

record straight, is to discuss plaintiff's misstatements in
sequence:
1.

Plaintiff claims, at page 3 of her Brief, that

Hardy
told Agent Rigby that he had a heart attack in
1974, seven years earlier [citations omitted.]
Rigby responded that the heart attack would
not affect issuance of the policy and that the
information need not be included in the application because Prudential disregards medical
history beyond five years old [citations
omitted.]
A reasonable person could not possibly give credence to
that statement.

On one hand, Mr. Rigby has unequivocally denied

making such a statement (Rigby Pep, at 9-10, 14.)

(Further,

Prudential claims personnel have testified decisively that sales
personnel, such as Rigby, never were advised that such a rule
existed (and, indeed, there was no such rule).
16-17; LeRoux Pep, at 41.))

(Frankel Pep, at

On the other hand, Mrs. Hardy's

testimony is too much a welter of contradictions to be taken
seriously.

At times, she claimed that Mr. Rigby told her and her
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husband that they did not have to reveal history more than five
years old.
tory.

However, her statements were confused and contradic-

She acknowledged that Mr. Rigby had presented the Hardies

with an earlier group insurance application in June, 1981, which
did request only a five-year history (Cheryl Hardy Pep., Exh. A)
and that "[e]verything would be so muddled between conversations
that I couldn't speak about one of them out of everything."
(Hardy Pep, at 31.)

She also testified:

Q. ... All of your recollections of your
discussions with Mr. Rigby up to the time
you started talking life insurance, those
are pretty vague and general?
A.

Yeah.

.Id. at 34.
I can't recall [Mr. Rigby] saying that
all you have to go back is five years.
Id. at 61 •
[I think Mr. Rigby said only five-year
answers were necessary] because that is
all the further that we went. ...
Id. at 65.
... [S]ometimes you hear what you
want to hear because that is what you are
listening for.
J^d. at 71 .

Well, the only thing that says five
years on here is question 10 and I believe
it was question 10 I was asking about.
Id. at 79. [Note: Question No. 10 of the medical questionnaire,
which questionnaire Mr. Rigby never had anyway, did request only
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five years1 history; Questions 7-9, which dealt with heart
history were not so limited.]
I think [Mr. Rigby] should have been
more specific.
^Id. at 109.
Mrs. Hardy was consistently clear about only one thing
in her ever-changing testimony:

she insisted that the only

people present during her discussions with Mr. Rigby were Rigby,
Lynn Hardy, herself and a stranger, whom she claimed,
incorrectly, was Launa Perry, the paramedical examiner.
51.)

(J^d. at

After Judgment was entered, Mrs. Hardy offered, in support

of her Motion to Reconsider, two nearly identically prepared
affidavits, one by her stepson, Mark Ith, and the other by her
former daughter-in-law, Jan Hardy, both of whom now claim that
they were present in the Hardy kitchen when Mr. Rigby told Hardy
"not [to] worry about the heart attack" or that "the heart attack
did not matter... ."

(£1. Br., Add, at 30-33.)

To believe plaintiff's story about Mr. Rigby, one first
would have to pick just which one of Mrs. Hardy's several contradictory statements he wanted to believe and then believe that the
meeting which she claimed consisted of the Hardies, Mr. Rigby and
Ms. Perry in fact consisted of five (or six, or seven -depending on how many more affiants plaintiff can find) people
clustered in the family kitchen, watching Lynn fill out an
insurance application.
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2.

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Hardy concealed his

history of heart disease from a paramedical examiner on August 2,
1981 "in

reliance upon Agent Rigby1s assurance that the old

heart attack need not be listed... ."

(Brief, 3-4.)

Inasmuch as

Mr. Hardy is long dead, that "factual" statement is no more than
speculation.
3.

Plaintiff claims, at page 5, that Hardy "omitted

[his history of heart disease] in continuing reliance on Agent
Rigby's prior instruction that it need not be listed" when he was
examined by Dr. Evans.

Again what the late Hardy did or did not

rely upon at most could he only surmise.
it clearly is not true.

Further, in this case,

Hardy told Dr. Evans about his childhood

rheumatic fever and his prostrate problems of eleven years
earlier; he concealed his heart attack of seven years earlier,
his angina pectoris and his visit to the High Risk Coronary
Consultation Center of less than two years earlier and his
current cardiovascular medication.

If he believed that he did

not have to reveal information more than five years old, he would
have omitted the old prostrate and rheumatic fever information
and revealed the very recent information of heart disease.
4.

Plaintiff claims, at page 6 of her Brief, that

Prudential "waived" a rating of the Hardy policy.

In fact, as

Prudential's medical director, Dr. Ketchum, testified, the medical
history Hardy revealed was "not ratable."

(Hardy Pep, at 16-18.)
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5.

Plaintiff claims, at page 6, that the Hardy

chest x-ray was not reviewed by Prudential until after the policy
was issued on October 7.

The claim file reveals, as plaintiff's

counsel knows, the chest x-ray was reviewed on September 28.
(Frankel Pep., Exh. 1 at 00223.)
6.

Plaintiff claims, at page 16 that Dr. Thorne

stated that Hardy's condition was in remission.

The Thorne

Affidavit (which was filed after the Court ruled on the Motion
and thus is not properly before the Court), says nothing of the
sort.

(PI. Br., Add, at 53-55.)
7.

Plaintifffs claim at pages 27-28, that Hardy's

history, as reported to Prudential, required 75 debits, and thus
required a rating of Special Class 2, is incorrect and looks
suspiciously like an intentional misstatement.

Plaintiff makes

her claim by attempting to perpetuate a misstatement in the deposition of Marilyn Reed, which was corrected in her affidavit in
support of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at
942-943) and disposed of specifically in defendants' Concluding
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at
1115, 1136.) (Plaintiff's footnote 7 represents that, under
Prudential's underwriting practice, Hardy's AV block which was
less than .23 seconds would have incurred debits.
would not have.

(R. at 1136.)

In fact, it

Therefore, there was no interre-

lated impairment and no additional debits.)
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8.

Plaintiff offers, at pages 17, 23, 26, 27 and 30 of

her Brief, excerpts from Prudential claim histories, which, as
the record reveals, never were qualified as to completeness or
otherwise, and thus cannot be offerred in evidence.
9.

Plaintiff insists, at page 37 of her Memorandum,

that one of the physicians Hardy reported having treated him also
was knowledgeable of Hardy's heart condition.

That physician was

Dr. Val Sundwall; it repeatedly was established below that the
attending physician at the time of Hardyfs heart attack was a Dr.
David Sundwall (R. at 1096; Frankel Pep., Exhibit I at 00068-70).
Further, it was repeatedly pointed out below that Dr. Val Sundwall
had signed a Department of Transportation physical examination
report in January, 1977, stating that Hardy had no history of
prior heart disease.

(R. at 1096.)

Obviously, he had no knowl-

edge of a prior heart condition.
Plaintifffs factual allegations could be dissected lineby-line.

It is sufficient to point out here that her Brief is a

collection of misstatements, misquotations and conjecture.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Conder's decision to enter Summary Judgment was
based upon a determination that plaintiff had been unable to
offer any substantial contravention of the testimony and affidavits which Prudential had put before him.

Inasmuch as discovery

had been completed, the case was to be tried to Judge Conder, and
he had the benefit of several hundred pages of memoranda and
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exhibits plus over an hour of oral argument, his factual determination is entitled to great weight.

As will be set forth

below, Judge Conderfs decision in the premises was fully consistent with applicable law.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE RECORD HEREIN CLEARLY REVEALS OMISSIONS
BY THE HARDIES WHICH DEFEAT THEIR CLAIM AND
WHICH ENTITLE PRUDENTIAL TO RESCISSION.
Prudential was entitled to deny the Hardy claim and is
entitled to rescission of his policy under UTAH CODE ANN.
§13-19-8 (1974 Repl. Vol.), which permits an insurer to reject a
contestable claim on the basis of

lf

[m] isrepresentations, omissions,

concealment of facts, and incorrect statements11 in an insurance
application, if those misrepresentations, omissions, etc., were:
(a)

fraudulent; or

(b) material either to the acceptance of the
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer;
or
(c) the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued, reinstated or renewed it at
the same premium rate, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in
as large an amount, or would not have provided
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting
in the loss, if the true facts had been made
known to the insurer as required either by the
application for the policy or contract or
otherwise.
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The Section's grounds for denial are disjunctive; any
one of them will permit an insurer to disallow a claim.

It is

undisputed that Prudential, in good faith, "would not have issued
...

a policy at the same premium ... if the true facts had been

made known as required ... by the application ..."; it thus was
entitled, under subsection (c), to refuse coverage.

Further,

there can be no serious dispute that Hardy's omitted history was
"material ... to acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard
assumed" by Prudential; it also was entitled to refuse coverage
under subsection (b).—

Indeed, there can be no real question

that Hardy's repeated concealment of a known and serious medical
problem was fraudulent; Mrs. Hardy's recovery was barred by subsection (a) as well as subsections (b) and (c).
Hardy's misrepresentations and omissions were fraudulent
as a matter of law.
If the insured at the time of making his application has knowledge or good reason to know that he is
afflicted with a disease which renders his condition
serious, and that thereby his longevity will be prejudicially impaired, his statements and representations to

—
Omission of an item as significant as a heart attack
necessarily is material, as a matter of common sense. It also
has been held to be material as a matter of law. Gilmore v.
Prudential Ins. Co., supra at 37 (W.D. Va. 1977) (so holding as
to a heart attack seven years before the application and entering
summary judgment for the insurer); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1980); Mooneghan v.
Wabash L. Ins. Co. , 412 F.2d 833, 834 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Ge"eF~v.
Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. , 273 N.Y. 261, 7 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1937)
(" [M] isrepresentation of symptoms of heart disease without more
would undoubtedly void the policies.") (Lehman, CJ^ (emphasis
added.)
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the contrary in reply to specific inquiries constitute a
fraud practiced upon the insurer,.. .
Prudential Ins, Co, v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 66, 448 P.2d 722, 723
(1968) (emphasis added.) (quoting Chadwick v. Beneficial Life
Ins, Co,, 56 Utah 480, 191 Pac. 240 (1920),)
The above rule of Chadwick and Johnson is doubly dispositive.

Not only did this Court construe the law authoritatively

in Johnson; the Legislature enacted Section 31-9-18 after
Chadwick,

It is a well-established canon of statutory interpre-

tation that a legislature, in incorporating a judicially defined
term into a statute, is presumed to have adopted that earlier
II
interpretation.E.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal, 634 F.2d 774, 783
(5th Cir. 1980.)
2/
-' Similarly, in Guardian L. Ins. Co. v. Eagle, 484 F.2d 382
(5th Cir. 1973), it was held:
The court was not required to believe, given the
nature and seriousness of Eagle's condition and the
frequency, duration and variety of his medical examinations, that he was unaware of his medical history or had
forgotten about previous treatments.
Id. at 384. Accord, New York L. Ins. Co. v. McCurdy, 106 F.2d
181, 187 (10th Cir. 1939) (fl[W]here proof of alleged fraud becomes
conclusive by uncontradicted evidence ... showing falsehood, concealment and misrepresentations, [the] question of ... fraud
becomes [a] matter of law... . " ) .
Finally, in McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co., 128 F.2d 660,
664 (4th Cir. 1942), cert, denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942), the Court
of Appeals held:
... [The] fraud ... required to avoid the policy is
shown to exist where there is a false representation
as to a material matter, ... false to the knowledge
of the applicant at the time it israade[,]... for
the purpose of being acted on by the company. ...
(footnote continued)
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Misrepresentations such as the Hardies1 consistently
have been held to authorize rescission of insurance contracts
and/or dismissal of actions for policy proceeds, frequently by
summary judgment.

In Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra at

36 (W.D. Va. 1977), the applicant, answering the very same
questions on a Prudential application which Lynn Hardy answered,
omitted a seven-year-old diagnosis of "a right bundle branch
block of the heart" -- a matter less serious than a seven-yearold acute myocardial infarction -- and follow-up visits to his
doctor as recently as two years before his application.

(Ibid.)

footnote 2 continued
[It] is idle to inquire further whether there was
intent to defraud; for the intent to defraud ... is
the intent to obtain the policy by the false representations. ... [W]hether the insured may honestly
have thought that he had recovered from the serious
ailment from which he knew that he had suffered and
for which he had consulted a physician is beside
the point. Inquiries were addressed to him ... for
determining whether the policy should be issued; he
knew that his answers would be ... acted on by the
company; and, when he made false answers which he
knew to be false as a basis for such action,
fraudulent intent ... may reasonably be inferred,
[citation omitted.] His good faith, under such
circumstances, is not a matter for speculation, but
must be determined from a consideration of what he
has deliberately done. [citation omitted.]
Accord, Taylor v. Sentry L. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir
1984); DiBenedetto v. Continental Assur. Co., 414 N.E.2d 1036,
1037 (Mass. App. 1981); Pendarvis v. Continental Serv. L. & H.
Ins. Co., 339 So.2d 367, 369 (La. App. 1976); Allen v. America:an
Nat'l Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 604, 607-608 (Tex. S.Ct. 1964).
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The district court found the omissions to be material as a matter
of law and held:
There being no controversy as to the misrepresentation and its falsity, this court's determination of its materiality determines the suit.
Ibid.
In Chadwick v. Beneficial L, Ins. Co., supra, 141 Pac.
at 245-246, the Utah Supreme Court held that it was error to the
trial not to direct a verdict for the insurer when a significant
former illness had been inquired about directly and was not
revealed.—
II •
THE RECORD PRESENTS NO BASIS UPON
WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN AVOID THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HER HUSBAND'S, AND
HER OWN, MISREPRESENTATIONS
A.

Contributory negligence is not a defense to

intentional fraud.

It cannot be seriously questioned that the

Hardies1 acts were fraudulent both as a matter of obvious fact
and of law.

Chadwick v. Beneficial L. Ins. Co., supra. There-

fore, mere negligence by Prudential could not defeat the company's
right to rescission in any event.

Fraud being an intentional

wrong, the victim's claim will not be defeated by simple negligence.

3/
—
The similar cases in which summary judgment had been entered
for insurers are legion. E.g., Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
supra; Mooneghan v. Wabash Ins. Co., supra; Life Ins. Co. of
North America v. Capps, 660 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1981) ; Davis v.
Integon L. Ins. Corp., 645 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The law will seldom allow the plea of contributory negligence to a wilful wrong* ... [T]he
modern trend "is certainly toward the doctrine
that negligence in trusting in a misrepresentation will not excuse positive wilful fraud or
deprive the defrauded person of his remedy."
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945).
... [W]here there has been intentional misrepresentation the common law does not exact a duty
of due cause or due diligence from the injured
plaintiff.
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 F.2d 955 (1977) (applying Utah law). Accord, Dugan
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980).
Utah requires a plaintiff's neglect to reach at least
the level of recklessness for his fraud claim to be defeated.
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162, 166 (Utah 1981).

Accord,

Cherkes v. Postal L. Ins. Co., 285 App. Div. 514, 516, 138
N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (1955), aff'd without opinion, 309 N.Y. 964,
132 N.E.2d 328 (1956).

To require otherwise would be to reward

any intentional deceiver lucky enough to spot an oversight by his
victim.

The rule should be strictly applied in this case where

plaintiff was not merely a beneficiary, but the owner of the
policy, an applicant for the policy and an active participant in
the fraud.
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to consider the Johnson-Holdsworth-Kohler rule in a case involving an
insurance misrepresentation.

However, there appears to be no

reason -- and there is no suggestion in the Utah case law -- that
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a different rule should apply.—

Indeed, this case is particu-

larly appropriate to the rule's application.

Ordinarily, the

plaintiff in a life insurance claim case was completely uninvolved in the application and innocent of any misrepresentation.
In this case, Mrs. Hardy herself made an intentional misrepresentation to the Equifax investigator (that Mr. Hardy had no history
of serious disease, etc.) and obviously was aware of, and privy
to, the misrepresentations which he had made to Prudential and
others of his medical history.

She was a conscious wrongdoer who

knew that she could profit handsomely from her husband's likely
death.
B.

Even if the defense of contributory negligence were

available as a matter of law, Mrs. Hardy could not successfully
invoke it here.
1.

There is no possible basis for claiming that

Prudential was negligent in its attention to Hardy's first degree
AV block.

A first degree arterioventricular block is a minor

abnormality.
underwriting.

That abnormality was considered in the Hardy
It warranted no debit or rating of the policy.

Hardy's family history warranted a debit, but not a large enough
debit to cause the policy to be rated.

(Ketchum Pep, at 16-18.)

—
There really could be no reason for a lesser rule; good faith
on the applicant's part is necessary to the whole insurance process and thus is mandated by the courts. E.g., Cohen, Friedlander
& Martin Co. v. Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66
(6th Cir. 1948).
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Plaintiff's counsel has made much of the notion that
Hardy's first degree AV block and family history were ignored
"red flags" of possible heart trouble.
48.)

(e.g., Ketchum Pep, at

In fact, Prudential treated that information as abnormal

data -- "red flags", if you will -- and debited the application
accordingly.

(IxL at 48-49.)

(Of course, plaintiff's pleadings

have not alleged that Prudential's treatment of the family
history was negligent, so that claim apparently is waived.)
debits were insufficient for even an SP1 rating.

The

(Ibid.) How-

ever, if the truth of Hardy's medical history had been known, he
would have been, a_t minimum, rated SP4 -- a much higher rating
entailing much higher premiums.
Plaintiff has suggested that Hardy's first degree AV
block and family history were so compelling that Prudential
should have known that he probably suffered from serious heart
disease.

This simply is not so. As Dr. Robert B. Wray, a highly

respected cardiologist, testified:
4.
[Hardy's purported medical history,
reports of examination, ICC physical examination reports and EKG results] (including
Hardy's family history of some significant
heart disease and EKG results), if considered
alone presents a person manifesting no symptoms of premature coronary atherosclerosis or
other heart disease and in no exceptional
danger of early death, and that the presence
of a first degree AV block on the included EKG
was a non-specific finding which could have
been congenital or a result of the childhood
rheumatic fever reported ... ;
5.
That a statement by Mr. Hardy that
he had no history or symptoms of cardiovascular
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disease or chest pains would have been completely plausible to a physician who had access
only to the information [Hardy provided];

9.
That [Hardy's true history] presents
a person who, as of August 25, 1981, was suffering from significant coronary atherosclerosis (even if he presently was experiencing no
subjective symptoms or disability), would continue to suffer from significant heart
disease, and, conservatively, would be deemed
to have a 2-4% annual chance of death from
heart disease -- a substantially greater risk
of early death than that of his typical contemporary.
(R. at 851-852.)
Plaintiff's claim of negligent inattention to Hardy's
examination results and family history is wholly without
substance.
2.

There is no possible basis for claiming that

Prudential was negligent in not performing a more extensive
examination of Mr. Hardy.
was appropriate.

Prudential's examination of Mr. Hardy

As Dr. Wray, who is both a teacher and clini-

cian, testified:
6.
That further examinations and/or
tests (such as an exercise EKG or -- more
drastic -- a cardiac catheterization) were not
indicated by the information in Attachment "A"
and that not performing such examinations or
tests cannot be considered negligent;
7.
That, according to the medical
records included to Attachment "B" hereto,
Lynn Hardy had undergone exercise EKG's as
recently as August 1, 1979 and the results of
those exercise EKG's were negative (i.e., not
indicative of symptomatic heart disease);
(R. at 852.)
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3.

The other possible claims of contributory

negligence which plaintiff has suggested are without merit.
Plaintiff has suggested that, because Hardy had some
family history of heart disease, Prudential should have realized
he was misleading it when he said he had no history of heart
disease.

(This can be characterized as the you-should-have-

known-he-was-lying defense -- one with interesting implications.)
This claim is unsubstantial.

As Dr. Wray has noted, Hardy's

misrepresentations were completely plausible, if a physician had
only the information Hardy provided Prudential.

(R. at 851.)

He

appeared to be a healthy man with some unhealthy relatives.
Plaintiff also suggested that Prudential should have
questioned Dr. Val Sundwall about Hardy's possible heart condition, suggesting that he might have told the company about the
1974 heart attack because, he allegedly had been Hardy's
attending physician at the time of that attack.

(Dr. Val

Sundwall is mentioned on the Hardy application as the doctor who
treated him for a prostate infection ten years earlier.)
is wrong on several points:

Counsel

Hardy's physician at the time of his

attack was Dr. David Sundwall (whom Hardy meticulously omitted
from his medical history, just as he omitted anyone or anything
else who could have revealed his fraud).

(Frankel Pep., Exh. 1

at 0057-60.) Dr. Val Sundwall obviously never knew of Hardy's
heart attack; he certified Hardy's false statement of no history
of heart disease on his 1977 ICC examination.

(Idi. at 00176.)
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Plaintiff also has suggested that Prudential was negligent
in not requesting a record of Hardyfs hospitalization for a
prostate infection at Cottonwood Hospital ten years earlier (even
though the prostatitis was unimportant from an underwriting
standpoint (Marilyn Reed Pep, at 81-82)), because a request for a
1971 prostatitis history, by luck, might also have turned up a
record of the 1974 heart attack (which, coincidentally, was
treated initially at Cottonwood Hospital).
whimsical at best.

This suggestion is

Hardy's earlier Cottonwood Hospital chart --

assuming it could be obtained after ten or more years -- could be
expected to show only the course of his prostate treatment and
general physical data, and his blood count.

(R. at 836-38.)

There was no reasonable basis for expecting it to contain
anything material.—
An insurer is required to exercise due care only in analyzing what an insured told it (which it may assume is truthful);
it is not compelled to search for omissions.
[There is no] burden on the insurer of looking
suspiciously and searchingly beyond the facts
disclosed for undisclosed ailments [citation
omitted]. The test is not one of what a prudent

—' Negligence does not consist of failing to make an investigation which might have proved serendipitous. An action's reasonableness is determined by what ordinarily was foreseeable at
the time. Sharpsburg Sand Co. v. Monongahela R. Consol. Coal &
Coke Co., 145 Fed. 424, 426 (W.D. Pa. 1906); Garafano v. Neshobe
Beach Club, Inc., 126 Vt. 566, 238 A.2d 70, 71 (1967) ; Daugherty
v. Hunt, 110 Ind. App. 264, 38 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1941); Sandidge
v. Atchinson, I. & S.F. Ry. Co., 193 Fed. 867, 872 (9th Cir.
1912).
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inquiry would have revealed. The question is
whether the information given, although partial,
was sufficiently indicative of something more to
be tantamount to notice of the unrevealed.
Cherkes v. Postal L. Ins. Co., supra, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 790
(emphasis added).—7
In reversing a judgment in plaintiff's favor, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Apolskis v. Concord L.
Ins. Co., 445 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1971):
[T]he district court thought plaintiff should
prevail because Concord made no investigation
of the insured's medical records as it was
authorized to do under the application. This
... is clearly contrary to Illinois law. An
insurance company need not make any independent
investigation and may rely on the truthfulness
of answers contained in an insurance application at least if there is nothing to put it on
notice that certain answers may be false.
Prudential is entitled to judgment of rescission as
a matter of law*

The information the Hardies withheld unquestion-

ably comes within the purview of UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-8 and
plaintiff's only asserted affirmative defenses are demonstrably
without substance.

—' In Cherkes, the insurer had been told that the applicant had
had a gall bladder operation. The company used that information
in its underwriting, but did not make further inquiry of the
insured's personal physician or of the hospital where the gall
bladder surgery was performed. If it had made such inquiries, it
might have (in that case, probably" would have) learned of applicant's omitted kidney condition. (Id. at 790.) Plaintiff's
contributory negligence claim in Cherkes was like Mrs. Hardy's
Cottonwood Hospital claim -- only better. The Appellate Division
(per Judge Peck) held that it was error to submit the question of
the insurer's due care to the jury, vacated judgment for the
beneficiary and ordered the complaint dismissed. (_Id. at 790-791.)
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C.

Plaintiff's allegation of "discrimination" cannot

entitle her to recovery herein.

Plaintiff appears to contend

that Prudential is barred from enforcing its rights by a supposed
breach of a supposed obligation to treat all claimants alike.
Apparently, plaintiff argues that, whether or not Prudential was
justified by its contract or by law in denying the Hardy claim,
it was barred from exercising that right by an alleged deviation
from a past claims practice.
Plaintiff apparently claims that, in denying the Hardy
claim for omissions, including omission of a heart attack seven
years before the application, Prudential deviated from an alleged
internal practice of not considering information more than five
years old in claims reviews.

Plaintiff also claims -- although

without legal rationale -- that her misrepresentations and those
of her husband somehow may be excused by Prudential's alleged
deviation from an internal procedure.
This claim fails on several grounds.
1.

The disposition of this claim was consistent

with Prudential's former practice.

This case is virtually iden-

tical to Gilmore v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, a 1977 case
arising from a 1974 application which omitted a seven-year-old
diagnosis.

Similarly, other claims regularly are reviewed on the

basis of the insured's entire history, not just the last five
years.

(R. at 954.)

If Prudential's claims personnel needed

a "precedent", they had several.

(Although courts have looked to

past practice as evidence when materiality is in question -- it
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is not here -- no court appears to have held that an insurer must
defend a lawful decision as also being consistent with disposition of some prior claim.)

An episode of serious disease without

follow-up treatment and monitoring for five years would be most
unusual.

(Ibid.)

However, in these unusual cases, Prudential

does deny claims when the omission was material.
2.

The Hardy application omitted material history

which was much less than five years old, such as his 1979 angina
pectoris and treatment.

The claimfs denial was not based upon an

omission of past treatments, but omission of a diagnosis of what
plaintiff admits by her own pleadings was a present

,f

serious

heart disease."—
3.

Plaintiff has offered no basis in legal prin-

ciple for claiming that alleged "discrimination" bars Prudential
from enforcing its rights.
to her.

Certainly, waiver is not available

A contracting party is free to enforce its current

rights, regardless of whether it chose to act differently at
some other time.

It waives a right only if it intends to

relinquish that right and "distinctly11 communicates that intent

—' If an insurer could not investigate beyond a five-year limit,
no lifelong condition, no matter how serious (heart disease,
hemophilia, cirrhosis or whatever), could be considered for
underwriting or claims purposes more than five years after its
positive diagnosis -- a simply silly suggestion.
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to the other party.

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61

P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936).

Accord, United States v. Chichester,

312 F.2d 275, 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S.
Lord Mech. Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556, 567 (1965).
There is no evidence that Prudential ever intended to waive any
rights or that it ever communicated such an intention to the
Hardies.

As has been pointed out above, Prudential keeps its

claims practices confidential and does not even disseminate them
to its field employees.
The foregoing rules concerning waiver apply to insurance
policies, which "are governed by the rules applicable to the
construction and enforcement of contracts in general." Williams
v. First Colony L. Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979).

It

specifically has been held, in Burr v. Lane, 10 Wash. App. 412,
517 P.2d 988, 995 (1974):
The insured cannot justifiably rely on the
insurer's words or conduct of which he is
unaware. [citations omitted.]
. . . .

...[W]hile waiver is a voluntary and
unilateral relinquishment of a known right, it
cannot be made operative upon an insured
ignorant of its relinquishment.
Plaintiff's claim is based upon an alleged claims practice which
counsel claims to have discovered since the litigation's commencement.

The Hardies admittedly were ignorant of this claimed

(and, in fact, non-existent) practice at all times material to
the action.

There could have been no waiver in these premises.
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4.

Plaintiff is asking the Court, in effect, to

become an arbiter of what claims decisions are equivalent to
others.

(Claims decisions often turn on such matters as the

claims personnel's appraisal of an insured's good faith.)

This

is a most unpromising chore, which could take days of unproductive litigation.
5.

Plaintiff's claim that five-year old histories

may not be a basis for rescission is inconsistent with the
policy of UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-8 that misrepresentation of facts
material to a risk insured or a premium charged on fraudulent
representations are grounds for rescission.
III.
THE HARDIES' MISREPRESENTATIONS CANNOT
BE EXCUSED BY CLAIMS AGAINST MR. RIGBY
A.

The taking of Hardy's medical history was not part

of Mr. Rigby's responsibility and his knowledge of an alleged
statement about it cannot be imputed to Prudential.

As has been

noted above, there is no substantial evidence supporting plaintiff's claims about Mr. Rigby.
it could not change the result.

Even if there was such evidence,
There are many cases in which an

agent's knowledge about an omitted item of medical history has
been imputed to his insurance company.

However, as far as

defendants' research indicates, all such cases involved agents
who had taken the medical history themselves.

(This is not

surprising; insurance agents take most medical histories.
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Most

companies make an exception only for large—usually six-figure—
policies.)

The general rule of agency is that:

...the knowledge of the agent will be imputed
to the principal only when it is relevant...to
the matters entrusted to the agent...
Roderick Timber Co. v. Willapa Harbor Cedar Prod., Inc., 29 Wash.
App. 311, 627 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1981); Accord, J. A. Jones Const.
Co. v. Englert Eng. Co., 438 F.2d 3, 6 (6th Cir. 1971); Sutton
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Notre Dame Arena Inc., 108 NH 437, 237 A.2d
676, 679 (1968).
The purpose of the above limitation is simple and sensible.

If every bit of information known by every employee of a

large organization were imputed to that organization, a company
would be bound by information which never reached those with
functional responsibility.

In this case, Mr. Rigby was not

responsible for taking Hardyfs history.

If Hardy had told him he

had had a heart attack—which he did not—Rigby could have
assumed that Hardy would be equally truthful with an examining
physician.

(It should be noted that not even the new affidavits

claim that Rigby advised Hardy to conceal anything.

They simply

say that he told him that the information was not necessary.

He

reasonably would have assumed that Hardy would be forthcoming if
he were told that the information was necessary.)

It is undis-

puted that Mr. Rigby did not participate in the underwriting of
the policy and, therefore, medical information would not have
reached him for review.
B.

Uncontroverted Facts Nos. 5-6.

The Hardies are estopped from asserting their claim

of Rigby1s knowledge.

Lynn and Cheryl Hardy deliberately with-

held information from Prudential.

When an insured knew of a
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falsity of a statement which he made in an application, he, as a
participant in the deception, is barred from interposing the
agent's knowledge.

Serdenes v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 319 A.2d 858,

863 (Md. App. 1974).
C.

The application, which both Hardies signed on August

4, 1981, stated clearly that an agent could not alter the
contract or waive Prudential's "rights or needs."

The policy

also provided that only an officer could vary the contract's
terms.

(Id. , Item 41.)

An agent who lacks apparent authority to
8/ It repeatedly has
waive his principal's rights cannot do so.—
been held that an agent's acts of the sort claimed against Mr.
Rigby cannot defeat the company's rights, if the insurer has made
a reservation such as Prudential's.

Blanton v. John Hancock

Mut. L. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 168, 171 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd,
463 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1972) ("When an agent's authority is
expressly limited, either by statute or ... an insurance policy,

—' Only an agent who is authorized to waive a principal's
rights can do so. A waiver is an "intentional" relinquishment of
a known right (Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, supra, 61 P.2d at
311-312) and, certainly, only an authorized employee can formulate a corporation's intent. Several courts have held specifically that no act of an agent can waive a principal's rights if
the agent lacks authority to make a waiver; there appear to be no
cases to the contrary. Globe Indem. Co. v. Cohen, 106 F.2d 687,
691-692 (3d Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 309 U.S. 660 (1940),
Public Warehouses of Matanzas, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, 77 F.2d 831, 833 (2d Cir. 1935); Coates v. St. Louis
Clay Products Co., 69 F.Supp. 902, 905 (E.D. Mo. 1946).

<

(

i
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the insured is on notice ...

and cannot rely on an agent's

representative to the contrary.11); ACF Produce, Inc. v.
Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 451 F.Supp. 1095, 1099 (E.D. Pa.
1978); APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §9121 (1968).
In this case, not only did the application provide
that an agent could not waive any of the company's "rights or
needs11, the policy provided that only an officer of the company
could modify the contract, "and then in writing."

Such clauses

repeatedly have been held to preclude waiver of a company's
rights by an agent.

E.g., Burr v. Lane, supra; Ayers v. Kidney,

333 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1964.)
D.

The Utah Insurance Code provides that an insurance

contract shall consist only of the written instrument setting
forth the contract of insurance (UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-11) and no
modification of a policy (which includes a waiver of its terms)
"shall be effective unless in writing executed by the insurer ...."
(UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-26.) Wickes v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267, 269 (1972) ("[A]n
insurance policy must be enforced as written, and ... cannot be
changed in favor of the insured except by a writing signed by the
insurer.")

The medical examiner's questionnaire requiring a

lifetime history and Hardy's verification, as well as the
Hardies' application (which accepted the limits on Mr. Rigby's
agency), all are part of the policy (Frankel Pep., Exh. I at
00245, 00266), which plaintiff now seeks to modify.
cannot be modified as plaintiff asks.
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The policy

E.

The Hardy claim's denial resulted from Hardy's

misstatements which thus cannot be connected to what Mr. Rigby
may have said.
11

A claim cannot be asserted in tort unless it is

identifiable with some definiteness11 to defendant's alleged act.

Anthan v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 521 F. Supp.
1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1981).

Accord, Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America,

564 F.2d 531, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).

The Hardy claim against

either Prudential or Mr. Rigby does not meet this test. Mr.
Rigby's alleged remarks to Hardy could not have "caused" him to
answer falsely the questions put to him by Dr. Evans and Ms.
Perry.

(Further, plaintiff is barred by the terms of the appli-

cation and insurance policy from setting up a claim against
Prudential based on Mr. Rigby1s alleged statements, as has been
pointed out above.)
IV.
PLAINTIFF HAS MADE OUT
NO CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH
Nothing in the record could support a claim of bad faith
herein.

An insurer's obligation of good faith is "only one

aspect of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all
contracts."
1985.)

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 401 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah

Plaintiff's claim of bad faith is wholly incompatible

with the definition of that term accepted in Utah law.
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Plaintiff's "bad faith11 claim further is incompatible
with the prevailing construction of the term "bad faith" itself.
This Court has defined "bad faith" as the absence of "good
faith", which is
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question will, [sic] hinder,
delay or defraud others. [citing Tacoma Assoc,
of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458,
433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967).]
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).

In Cady (which

was brought under a "bad faith" litigation statute (UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-27-56 (1983 Supp.)), the Court held that "bad faith"
requires a finding of no honest belief in the act's propriety or
a specific intent to take unconscionable advantage or to oppress
or defraud.

]A.,

671 P.2d at 152. The Court has defined "bad

faith" elsewhere as "the deliberate doing of something the actor
knows to be wrong or erroneous."

Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99

Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619, 624 (1940).

Nothing in this record

suggests that Prudential was motivated by anything but an honest
belief that the Hardy claim was without merit (just as a court
had found the Gilmore claim to be without merit).

To claim "bad

faith" in these premises is frivolous.
Neither UTAH CODE ANN. §31-1-8, 31-27-1(1) nor the
Insurance Department regulations cited by plaintiff at pages 63
and 64 of her Appendix may create a private right of action going
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beyond that of Beck,

First, Prudential has done nothing viola-

tive of those statutes or regulations; second, a private right of
action cannot be inferred from those regulatory laws and rules.
The legislative intent to grant or withhold
a private right of action for the violation of
a statute, or the failure to perform a statutory duty, is determined primarily from the
form or language of the statute. The nature
of the evil sought to remedied, and the purpose the statute was intended to accomplish,
may also be taken into consideration. In this
respect, the general rule is that a statute
which does not purport to establish a civil
liability, but merely makes provision to
secure the safety or welfare of the public as
an entity, is not subject to a construction
establishing a civil liability.
Wick Realty, Inc. v. Napili Sands Maui Corp., 620 P.2d 750, 754
(Haw. App. 1980) (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806
(Utah 1974), a securities case, this Court held:
While that section [UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-1, ,
which is identical to Section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act] makes certain practices unlawful, it does not provide for a private right of action for its violation. The
plaintiffs urge this court to fashion a
remedy, but we are of the opinion that it is a
matter best left to the legislature.
.Id. at 808.
In the present case, the presumption against a private
right of action is particularly compelling.

Chapter 27 of the

Insurance Code specifically provides both criminal and administrative penalties for violation of its terms or of any regulation
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promulgated under it.

(UTAH CODE ANN. §§31-27-1,2.)

The legis-

lature created a comprehensive scheme of duties and penalties to
be enforced only by the Insurance Commissioner and public
authorities.

There is no suggestion of an intent to create a

private right of action or defense based on violations, real or
imagined, of the Chapter.
V.
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
Plaintiff's purported factual contentions consist principally of Mrs. Hardy's wholly implausible testimony (and her
relatives' belated and obviously contrived affidavits) plus the
untimely affidavit of Dr. Thorne (Pi.. Add, at 53-54.)
testimony is not worthy of further comment.

The Hardy

The Thorne affidavit

states simply that Hardy had had no recent symptoms (Id. at 54,
§4) (which does not contradict Dr. Wray's statement that, symptoms or none, he still had a serious occlusion and reduced life
expectancy) and that his family history, smoking, etc. suggested
"potential cardiac abnormalities" (Id. at 55, §8) (which does not
contradict Dr. Wray's statement that such potential indications
are not diagnostic of actual disease and that Hardy had concealed
the existence of such disease).
In sum, none of plaintiff's factual claims are supported
by "substantial" evidence and, thus, there can be no "genuine"
issue of fact left for decision.
464 (1st Cir. 1975).

Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 ,

Accord, Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d
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102, 106 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied,

:

U.S.

, 104 S.Ct.

392 (1984); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
As the Utah Supreme Court has held, a party's testimony
which, "besides being self-serving, was inconsistent" with the
evidence derived from all other sources, could not defeat summary
judgment.

Anderson v. Beneficial Fire and G. Co., 21 Utah 2d

173, 442 P.2d 993 (1968).

Accord, Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v.

Sylk, 481 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1972); Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives
v. Department of Commerce, 576 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C. 1983).
VI.
PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT
PRUDENTIAL'S RIGHT OF RESCISSION
IS WITHOUT BASIS IN STATUTE
OR THE CASE LAW
Prudential is entitled to rescission of the Hardy policy
as a matter of law.

As the Utah Supreme Court held in Dugan v.

Jones, 615 P.2d 1234, 1247 (Utah 1980):
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has
the option to rescind the transaction and
recover the purchase price or to affirm the
transaction and recover damages. The choice
... belongs to the victim of the fraud and a
choice cannot be forced upon him.
The Dugan decision, which was made in the context of a
fraud case, is consistent with the general rule of rescission.
A party who has been induced to enter into a
contract by a material misrepresentation of
fact has the option of ... avoiding the
contract at his election . ... [I]f he
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force for two years during the insuredfs lifetime.
ANN. §31-22-3.)

(UTAH CODE

No applicant would have a reason to tell the

truth on an application, if the only sanction for misrepresenting
a risk (and thus saving potentially large premiums) were paying
back the higher premiums out of the eventual recovery -- and not
even having to do that if the lie was undiscovered for more than
two years.
No reported decision, as far as diligent research can
determine, ever has qualified an insurer's right to rescind for
misrepresentation.

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court specifically

has held that concealment of "an essential element in estimating
risk11, without more, entitles an insurer to rescind a policy.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardenlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293
(Utah 1980)
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Judgment shall be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
RICHARD B. FERRARI
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondent
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;ompe I „n^ D i s c - e n

Defenda~"~

;r. . e u u l a r ;

?arie

was r e p r t o t n L u w

!•::

Vjainst

: .

:

Civil

defendants

o:

. ^ r^a^c.
tne

ar.n

Air-en

:

H n arable

were represented

by

Ferrari,

Tire;

examined

t i *• r e l e v a n t

IT IS n r p p p /
;. (] )

.. * .* r : e x n i b i t . : ,

PRDEPEP

enter

the

:

i

* ~

that*

: ..

produce the remaining f: lus identifier
McConfc
Jthned

rii.*

-

- Mnpany

r

t-
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.Request' f o r P r o d u c t i o n of Documents, w h i c h f i l e s
a t P r u d e n t i a 3 "s Nor t h - C e n t r a l Home O f f i c e
,•; ')ta

shall

be p r o d u c e d

:i n Minneapol i s , Mi i m p -

a I: B i: • s a s o n a b ] e t :i i rie tc be agr ee« 1 u|

m III») I lit \ ia i t i t '

m a t t e r of s a n c t i o n s i s r e s e r v e d f o r fi l t u r e h e a r i n g .
•;

(2)

Th/e heard ng on d e f e n d a n t s " '

• _ •••

Mot i o n s f o r Summary Judgment

: »i I t i i n i :=!:<:l w:i t l :i, : I it d a t e i i:i: i t i ] 1: ::: t:::l i p a r t i e s h a v e c o m p l e t e d
*-very.

By October 15, 1984, each party i s to provide the other

wxtn a 1 :i st ' r :' *
^jj^.q
-> t a l l

:>

dis-

. iDerail

" ,r"

"'

r 2i na :i n :i i :t ::j d:i s 20^ rery

A^WI. L.tC . uxt

a. . u- : -•: -

.„, -, - ar "ih-liiierns t~ ^ l e a d i n c r s

i.jsr

e R<- r e q u i ^ s

- a i r . r ;: r "

Ameiii P l e a d i n g s and t n e p r o p o s e d amen sea i l e a c s i n a s f*i
. DATED t h i s

:v

-• ? r t o b e ?

i

therewith,

^o-i.

By
(

"District Judge

Certificate of Hand-Delivery
I HEREBY CERTIFY tha-

¥^

:i«

: t ob« -: ,

i

J C 4

/p

TTPST

feEY
/^J^J(Ysrts&4\*~l

* r JC ar:

, db

. ^ . ; ..;Vw

, Richard B. Ferrari, Esq.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
. 310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt LaV.e -r.ity, Utah 84] 11

^ ^ v ^ :
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IflLMED]
F'.L£D !N Ci.^F.K o OFFICE
Ga't UJ-0 County Utah

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
R I C H A R D B . FERRARI (Bar N o . 1064)
310 South M a i n Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3300

>5i Ccfurt

U'<2^
Deputy Ciork

I 11 n:iw 'i'• 1111 Hi | 1'inl,\wi s

IN T H E DISTRICT COUR'

' ^ _

_-.;_ COUNTY

|

STATE OK UTAH
I

UIKHYI

I

HM'M'iY,
'

Plaintiff,

ORDER

:

!

j

vs.
i

THE P R U D E N T I A L INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA and
WAYNE L. RIGBY,

Civil N o . C-83-7195

!
t

!

Defendants.

f

T h i s " n a t t e r h a v i n g come b e f o r e
i 1 «i 11 liiiiii III l\i I (Mil1 iili'i

I In

mi i ! i <

i iiJL»,

law and m o t i o n c a l e n d a r on

1 9 8 5 , Dan P. H u s h n e l l and M e r r i l I

i I p | » * » a i t • II ni

ni ni

111•» 11 «-i 1 I

':frV-

" a'

1 li,nni?,«Hindiiiiii hot isiinii inure i m d^.;.cd

F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 8 5 , on t h e r e g u l a r
March 1 , \

t h e Court on

1 1 1 11 i i i ni ni II i i II

i in ni 11

F, N e l s o n ,
h i i ' 11 r ) i i ni

mi'

Esqs,
II i mi i

II r i

f

Esq, having appeared on behalf ot d e f e n d a n t s , and I lit1 tour I.,
1

,ivi!H» i o n s i d e r e d

tho statements

having re-examined
Memorandum D e c i s i o n

l hu

IIJI

aid s u b m i s s i o n s of c o u n s e l

MUMII,

s h o u l d be

li.o i ny, del erui i ncd lliiiil

and
its

reaffirmed,
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io SO ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
s den I ed .
DATED t h i s

2 t>

day of March, 1985.

,^.A/DEANSICONDER
District Judge
•J* *****

y

f

*r •-

IS

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11W

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
RICHARD B. FERRARI
JOSEPH T . DUNBECK
310 South Main Street, 12th Floo,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
"' CHERYL HARDY,
y

w .

5o
* t
l ©
«
I I

is
0

v-

(t U
0
0 t
X

c <

'.
Plaintiff,
r
i'
vs.
•
THE
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
1
COMPANY OF AMERICA and
! WAYNE L. RIGBY,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT B. WRAY, M.D.

i

I

^ivil No. C-83-7195

•

i;

Defendants,

SS
t

<

u <"

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT 'LAKE
ROBERTS. W RAY, M.D., being first duly sw or nf deposes

1
extJLusivtf

Tl: iat 1: :ie is a physician and surgeon, engaged in the
• - ce of c ardi ol ogy;

2
fardiologv

-

'•''

' 1 1: B > I: I: i • e :I s a I € • 11 c * : f 11: :i c A:i i i c an Coil
and a Diplomate

of

the American Boards

of

Inter"al

Ml fill 11, ni mi ni mi1 iri ni nil "I HI i nil ni n v -i«, mi I ,ii ni I n M J ni
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t

faculty of the Schoo] of Medicine ot the University of Utah from
1971 to 1979f a c h i e v i n g t h e rank of A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r of Mer
cine,

i mi I i I p i e s n i l I \ i

1 the University
1

ii l I in i ii I fibs i ii'iitt

I "il of to hi 11 i I

n! Utah?

Tim it h e h a s r e v i e w e d i h t f o l l o w i n g
a.

Attachment

"/ "

and r e p o r t s o f e x a m i n a t i o n ,

documents:

irons i s t i n n ! c t m e d i c a l
electrocardiogram

h i <? t r i ,

ill11! h i I r e s u l t s ,

r e p o r t s of I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Commission p h y s i c a l
tjnn<

e

NMIH

and ii p r i s m i i i l

li i s 111 r ,' » nifiniiU y

Lynn H a r d y ;

• .

examina-

iippat IMI I \\ nil I In

.

I ih

-

Ul

ID *
0. <

h

3 I

.<

V.

recoiJs,

3 3
C
if >•

id w o £
2 ?. u
c* y

in o:

c <
*<
i «
*

I
Hani,

Attachment

"B" , r o n s i s t i n g o t v a r i o u s

a p p a r e n t l y I I lie I d l e
Jiiat,

f am i I r llii'l

in r n s o p t i o n ,

medical

Lynn llruily;
v

Attachment

h"

i , i I < im l. 11 in i f i i i-inf h e a r !

(including
ilispasn

rjnnl I F "*»

r e s u l t s ! » if c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e , p r e s e n t s a p e r s o n niidi mi t e s t i n g in
symptoms of p r e m a t u r e c o r o n a r y a t h e r o s c l e r o s i s o r e t h e r
disease

IJM I

in in c u i r ^ l

p r e s e n c e of a f i r s t
non-specific

ili-iii|i'i

11 I till 1 jf iIra I Ii

d e g r e e A' r !\ ' on the

f i n d i n g which

of t h e c h j J d h o o d
5,

JUIIUIII

CJUXU

1 Ii

lebuit

i in, aLuai.miieiiL

'"I'llhJl a s t a t e m e n t b y M i . H a r d y t h a t

lor syTTIIif orri'i n f r ri I'd 11 »VA "IIHIIII] a ir d i ^MHSf

iiii I llliiil

i in?lurlei1 EKG was a

iiave been c c " - : -

rheumatic tever reported

heart

< ;

lie h a d n o h i s t o r y

i n i ln> s I j r\ i iir1! \ « i nil I rl ha 1 1

[been completely plausible to a physician who had access only lo
the information in Attachment "A";
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II

ifli, That further examinafionr a^

. .?. A

exercise EKG or "•"• more drastic •• I,J a
were

not

i ndj cdteij

liny

I lie

isurfi as an

catheterization)

m l ni'niiil, 1.1.111 i

in I il Ihidt

not performing such examinations or tests cannot be considered
. - ill „

»m

?

That, according In I hi1 medical record

IIHJIHIMI

IO

Attachment "R" hereto, Lynn Hardv had undergone exercise EKG's as
||i e c e j i i , II y r.is A I N U I I

I

I'll

I

n Il I In

mi I ' S i i l I

nf

t ho-a?

t- n e r r i s e

EKG's were negative (i.e.f nol indicative i;»l symptomatic heart
(disease) ;
it

I

*i

Ill"11 .i" i

' ,j" 'i;"/" 1 1 11 \i Lrii ;• ",J, i \ ' )

"whcse c a t h e t e r i z a t i , o n

' J e"..) a < ', \"" -

II*•' *

i e * 11:

» |, • H T «•?•"

in, 1974 had i n d i c a t e d n e a r - 1 c t a 1 occ 1 usiori

I'jf t h e ir „ .iht c o r o n a l > t i i t r r
1

iiiirli a m o d e r a t e o b s t r u c t i o n of

the

I

jnrcumflexcoronary

a r t e i y (d s At t a c lima 11 L.

11,

i e 1 i e c L s I vt u u 11, J i r i e \ >

II

"ifiitilV s t i l l have been s u f f e r i n g
fin

I

thus I

t loin

s i g n i 1. u : a i i l l ,

from s i g n i f i c a n t

h e a i , I ill i s e a b i 1 1

in

atherosclerosis

' uqiu'il

Il lMi I

i

ll

I", "That Attachment "B" presents a person

Ill,

as of

'I
i|Bii]gii,Lf
sclerosis

I " IH I ini p CT I i f f i i* i ii i from s i g n i f i c a n t c o r o n a r y a t h e r o (even il ht p r e s e n t l y was e x p e i ' i e n c i m | MM IIULIMM I i"i'

ipymptoms or d i s a b i l i t y )

f

would c o n t i n u e

||.'*nt hi-iii I i I I se'rise , drill i roijSPT \'d1 i aj>l,
nave a 2-4^ a n n u a l

I

•/.

c h a n c e of d e a t h

t.o s u f f e r

from

signifi-

W HI hi he deemed t o

Hi unit llioaii d i s e a s e — a

' • 3
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substantially greater risk of early death than that of his typical contemporary.
DATED this £•&

day of September, 1984.

ROBERT B. WRAY, M.D.J
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

2£>

day of

September, 1984.

rx^ $fr<p^
Residing at
My commission expires

I'lG-bb
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jACVC.

QLJTLA-S

«{1«. Proposed Insured's n- ~'c — first, initial, last (Print)

ID. Sex

LJ&MQ
3.

Q Single
•

JJMarried
Separated

Q Widowed
Q Oivorced

^

No. 4 £ * £ L S t r e e t A L — s L c u T 4 £ * & r c L .
S*fS

**&*«.
J&nfmL
s-v yix. 7.
proposed for coverage, give
fspoui
6.

.> I f f l f f l ^ l Qr««

Address for mail

5b. For how longt

5a. O c c u p a t i o n s ^

i I B . «-><Jic v i w.<

IIVA!
'
i f spouse
a.
Name is proposed for
b. Date of birth| c. Age
Place i«. Amt. of life
of birth
ins. in force
Mo. IDay j Yr.

C

C

State ^

Zip^^x/5

For each child proposed for coverage give:
First name & 1 Relation-1Oate of birth! Amt. of life
initial
1 ship
Mo. lOayl Yr. ins. in force

[

a.

1

1

1 1

b
c.
I 8b. Initial amount
d.
a.
f.
|10. Accidental de*t:> coverage
cove

1$

8a. Kirvl of policy

. fyf?
9.

P+ c Tfpju \ *zc0. OPO

ting if not
Rating
Standard

a. Initial amt $
Insurance for a child will not start until the 15th day
b. Rating Q 2 D 3 Q 4 Q 5 of life.

| 11. To apply for any of these Supplementary Benefits, give dttails:
.Year Decreasing Term on Insured
Initial Amount.
• b.

f. Family Income to
Insured $

Year Decreasing Term on Q Spouse
Q Insured & Spouse $
Initial Amount

th Contract Anniversary or.
per month.

g. Family Income to 20th Contract Anniversary on
D Spouse D Insured & Spouse $
per month

c Decreasing Term to Age 65M/68F on Insured
$
Initial Amount.

h. Family Income to Age 65M/68F on Insured
$
per month

d. Decreasing Term to Age 62M.65F on Spouse
$
Initial Amount.
•
Year Level Term on Insured $
• L •• vel Premium r ) Mod. Premium

i. Family Income to Age 52M.SbF on Spouse

$

per month.

j . Level Term on Dependent Children $_

k 0ption to Purchase Additional InsutanceS.
^
y / A
. (Do not complel* for a family or insured & Spouse Policy
12. Beneficiary:: s*
Name
(For insurance payable upon death of (1) the Insured, and (2) an insured child auer the death o f the Insured i
there is no insured spouse.)

r^/revt.

•//»&!>/ ^,^,J^ JUt&r.

13. State any special request.

M*2Z~

14. List all life insurance, annuities and variable contracts on proposed Insured. (If NONE, so state.)
Kind C.ife.
Initial Year
Med'i
Company
3T>t ,issued
. . _ _ _ End't .Gfoup)
Y
CidQA
j£&.
&

22_

a
D

15. Will this insurance replace or change any existing insurance or annuity in any company on any
person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes", give tho-*- names, name of company, plan, amount and policy Yes
numbers.
LJ
16.f!; anyone applying for, or trying to reinstate, life or health insurance on any person named in l a , 6 or Yes
7 in this or any company? If "Yes", give amount, det<v!s and company.
Q
17. Does any person named in la. 6 or 7 plan to live or travel outside the United States and Canada Yes
wrthin the next 12 months? If "Yes", give details.
D
18. Does any person named in 1a, 6 or 7 p'3n to fly an aircraft, glider, balloon or like device or, within the
•St 2 years, has anv such person flown a* a student pilot, pilot ot crew member or had any other Yes
duties aboard an aircraft, gMiinr. balloon or like device while in flight (including flight for flight pay)?.. Q
If "Yes", complete Aviation Questionnaire.
19. Has any person named in 1a or 6, within the last 12 months:
Yes>
a. been treated by a doctor for or had a known heart attack stroke creancer other than of the s k i n ? —
D
b. had an electrocardiogram for chest pain or for any other physical complaint, or taken medication
for high blood pressure?
D
20. Premiums payable

Q .Ann.

21. Amount paid $ / £ / .

Q Semi-Ann.

&f~

• Quar J j ^ o n .

f"3 PaV- Budg.

G

pf

'^-M >tic D Gov't. A:

D None (Must be "None" if either 19a or 19b is answered "Yes")

22. Is it understood that a medtcel examination will be made on any person named in 1a, 6 or 7? If "Yes'
on whom?

Yes

23. If 22 is "Yes", is it agreed that no insurance will take effect on anyone until all medical examinations
are made, even though 21 shows that an amount has been paid?

Yes
/ G

24. Changes made by Home Office.

The proposed Insured declares that, to the bert of his or her knowledge and belief, the above statements s
complete and true. When Prudential gives a receipt form. ORD 223L5 79. of the same date as this Part 1, cover a
will start as shown in that form. Otherwise, no coveuiyc will >tart u n l o s : (1) a contract is issued. (2) it is accept*end (3) the full first pi erbium is paid while all persons to be covered are living and t eir health r-jmains as stated
Parts 1 and 2. If all these take place, coverage will start on the contract date Any entry in 24 made at a Home Off"
will be approved by acceptance cf the contiact. B i * .vhee the law requires written consent for any change in tt
application, such a change can be «n»»de only if ;nose who *ign this form approve the change in writing. No age
can mine or tfnange a curfnai'i, tn w ^ i * w •**< ?".*»» r>>j;i'.;*.r;qjijs Q: needs.
OWNERSHIP: Unless otherwise isk*d :or a' ovc. the o.-.ner of the contract will be (1) the applicant if other than *
proposed Insured, otherwise (2) the proposed Insured. 3-jt this is subject to any automatic transfer of owners!
stated In the contract.
,f
Application
y->
madeaj^v

JL
Witnesl

/?j

^ State

, „

..

^Ms£Lq*.t (MA
Y. ..»&•

nrj Representative)
itneseed b/Licdnsed Agent (Wr/JJnj
Signature,

Insured
I S i g n . W e of Proposed Ir;

\±4r?&4i

S u i n a t y ^ y T A p p i i c a f ^ / f othor than proposed lnsure<

^V//.//,

*n\ H * l « m <v wO<po<ynr. utMiT tt«m« o* company!

Lp<_

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ngmng lor fw«n or corporation)

Uaety/

IV/JJA;
2.

Irving'

Forney record

Hmor
•rothen

Uving .

Deed

iibsuHiI

Cause

Afit Yeer

i4n frhrirvn

Sisters
No

LuaEooi /Jf\
a.
b.

Peed

Yeer
[OftKfftX/UrH

Afll

m^KngJ JCL.

Has your waight changed mora than 10 pound* in the paat yaar? ,
If "Yes". Gain
fos.
Loaa
lbs. fteeeon for change

YatD No£.

c. How long h i the preeent weight baen tht aamt?
4

Have you ever emoked?
.kh?..<**rrM..*4.y*+^.r:A.fK*^/.*+#
if "Yes" Qivt datt(t) tatt amokad: Cigsrettos Mo. Yr.
Doers Mo.

Yes ft No £
Pipe Mo. Yr.

Yr.

5. Whtn did you laat oonautt a doctor?
Mo. f
Yr. ? 7 (Give details In 12.)
6. Art you now being treated or taking madicina tor any-condition or disease?.

•VasDNo^
Haw you ever:
Yes Nc
• a. Jtad any surgery or baen advised to have surgery end have not done so?
D &
-av-been in a hospltil, sanitarium or other institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or treatment? B D
e. iiguteity used or am you now using, barbiturates or amphetemines, msrijusns or other hallucinatory drug*, or heroin, opiates or other narcotics, except as prescribed by a doctor?
• S
d been treated or counseled for alcoholism?
• 5
S3, had (He or health insursnce declined, postponed, changed, rsted-up or withdrawn?
Q E>
t had Irfe or hearth insurance canceled or Us renewel or reinstatement refused?
Q S
Have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of:
Yes*o
a. high Wood pressure? (If "Yes", state datefound,rf drugs are used end if stHI being treated.) .. D CS
-b. chest pain, pressure or discomfort? (If "Yes", stats where tested, number of attacks, their
duration, date of last attack end treatment)
Q &
c. heart murmur or rheumatic fever? (If rheumaticfover,state number of attacks, date of laat attack
and how long disabled for each.)
Q D
d asthma, emphysema or tuberculosis?
.•
D C
0. tumor, cancer, leukamis, diabetes or ayphiHs?
D IS
1 nervous trouble, convulsions, epilepsy or mental disorder?
Q

I
9.

Other then as shown above, have you ever been treated by a doctor for or had any known sign of s

\ or oUsotdsr of the:
a. heart, erteries or veins?
eV lungs, chest or throat?
c. ferain or nervous system?
d aver, geUWedder, atomach, inteet or rectum?

Yes N
s.

Sidneys, bieddor, genital organs or urinary tract?
spine, joints, skull or other bones?

f.

D
D

F
&?

g. bfood, glands or akin?
D
ft
h. ears, eyes, nose or sinuses?
D Z
10. Other then es shown ebove, have you in the pest S years:
Yes h
a. consumed or been attended or examined by any doctor or other practitioner?
B L
b. tied electrocardiograms, X-rays for diagnosis or treatment, or bfood, urine, or other medical
easts? (If "Yes", stats dates, why made and by whom.)
Q L
c

*n*dm oiahn tor or mam***

' •

Q»

bmimMxm. compenaation. or a pamoion bocou— of m*kr*mm or kyury?

11. Do you now hsve s known sign of sny physical drtordsr, dieaees or defect not shown ebove?
12. Whet sre the full details of the enswsr to 5 snd to seen pert
Illness or other reeson.
K operated, so state. Resson
for
sny check-up, doctor's edvice,
Began
Question No. treatment end medication.
Mo. Yr.

—C

,? *> •*• e f r a ^

UL-

/L#3gag* \

of 6 through 11 which is enewered "Yes"?
Time lost
from normal
activities

SZ-JU

y^*£~+-

lo yrf

Full
recovery
Mo. Yr.

PRINT full names
end addresses of
doctors snd hospitals

"ffCii
^ ft.., C~
"7

fr

c*ft* ~

ht^^y
/).

fa

m

iVeT-Mi.l

W'U~"*'

TTTi

^

if

Q

YeeQ N o p

4'

_LCLJ,

u^farfpu

/lV*VT —

U

.i^w7 <;.

"T^rs

L° fc+te

C+~t*<«
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WATKISS a CAMPBELL
RICHARD B. FERRARI (Bar No. 1064)
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 64101
(801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
8TATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT

^

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA and
WAYNE L. RK3BY,

Civil No. C-83-7195

Defendants.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
I SS.

COUNTY OF VENTURA

)

MARILYN REED, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states:
~"

1.

That she is a former senior underwriting

consultant of The Prudential insurance Company of America
("Prudential") and, except as otherwise is indicated, ahe makeB

^O'
this Affidavit on the basis of her personal knowledge;
2.

That she was employed in the Prudential under-

writing department from 1973 until 1984 (with the exception
of approximately fifteen months in the claims department) and
is familiar with Prudential's underwriting practice during that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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3.

That she was the senior underwriter in

the processing of the application for insurance policy
on the life of the late Lynn Hardy (which policy was
approved for issuance on October 8, 1981)?
4.

That the medical history and physical

examination of Lynn Hardy, taken in connection with
\

his application, presented the following negative date:
a first degree arterioventricular ("AV") heart block
and a family history of cardiovascular disease;

U
IMS
a;ll

5.

j

J

u

"MSu
v>! <
sf §s
<t « I 3

Mi

That the Prudential Medical Underwriting

Manual does not provide debits for s first degree AV
heart block of .22 second (such as Hardy's) (Bxh. "A"
hereto) but does provide twenty to forty debits for
a family medical history such as Hardy's (Ixh. HB"
hereto);

. v
6.

. . .

That because of the absence of additional

negative information, Hardy was assigned only twenty
debits for family history;
7.

That the foregoing debits would not have

justified even a Special Class 1 rating for Mr, Hardy,
under the Medical Underwriting Manual's guidelines;
8.

That, had Prudential been informed of

Lynn Hardy's 1974 heart attack, angiogram results and
-2-
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other heart-related history, the Medical Manual's guidelines
would have indicated at least Special Class 4 with
a temporary extra premium to age fifty and she is certain
he would have been rated accordingly;
9. that ocassionally a Prudential underwriter,
for competitive or business reasons, rates a policy
lower (i.e., more favorably to the applicant) than
the Medical Underwriting Manual would indicate, but
no such circumstances appeared in the Hardy case; and

3 I|
fill
uiss
«i«g
!S I it

S *e 5

10. That, because there would be no competitive
or business reason for raising a rating; affiant believes
it highly unlikely that a Prudential underwriter ever
would rate an applicant higher than the Medical Manual
indicated;
DATED ..this //.day of January, 1985.

I ,;
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /J//Say1
of January, 1985.
-

ys usi
i\ > ^>
Notary Public
Residing at: A ? C >#y#g/fey

My commission expirest

/9u$. ?. rt*C
*3-
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Af£R. MARTINEZ

Ventricular Tachycardia:
Paroxysmal ventricular tachycardia usually indicates organic heart disease and is cf pr*at
underwriting significance. However, it is necessary to make a distinction between tht
finding of ventricular tachycardia on a resting ECC in contrast to an isolated finding
of two, three or occasionally more YFBs in a row without substantial duration or repetition
especially during or just after an exercise ECC. It is the spontaneous ventricular tacnvcardia of some duration that points to prob.ible serious heart disease more than the exercij-t
provoked short burst, although the latter also suggests a possibility of significant underlying heart disease. No case should be rated without an attending physician's statement,
electrocardiogram and medical consultation.
The rating for ventricular tachycardia should be the same as the angina rating (diagnosed by
objective diagnostic findings). A short burst of VPBs on an exercise ECC may be accepted at
50 debits, however, do not add these debits if the tracing is being rated for a positive
exercise response as evidenced by S-7 segment changes.
Sinus Arrhythmia
This is a change in heart rate, transr.itted to the radial pulse, usually related to the phases
of respiration, and of no significance under age 50. When marked, age 50 and over, a careful
survey of the cardiac status is indicated, and an electrocardiogram is advisable for large
amounts.
Heart Elock
This is due to delayed conduction of impulses through the heart. An intermittent pulse may
result. In most cases it is recognizable only by electrocardiogram and the diagnosis should
not be accepted without it. Occasional instances a history of block may be disregarded when it*
is conclusively established to have been a transient toxic phenomenon of remote date.
Condition stable 5 years or less or duration unknown:

Age Under 4Q

40-49

50 & Over

1st degree block
PR .23-.24 PR .25-.30 PR over .30 -

0
30
55

2nd degree block -

80

175

225

3rd degree block -

125

225

275

30*
55
80

55*
80
125

*If heart rate 50-60/min. consider possibility of 10 point reduction.
Condition stable over 5 years, debits may be reduced up to 25«.
Condition stable over 10 years, debits may be reduced up to 50*.
With known recent development or definite progressive prolongation
increase debits 50 to 100 points.
Stokes-Adams syndrome should be rejected.

(Rev. 10-80)
Printed in U.S.A.
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•3*'j&?j£jf-.'••'•'•: COTTONWOOD U.O.S. HOSPITAL
;;;•-•-j-5'v••<• . - . .
Murray. Ut»h

:

W DISCHARGE SUMMARY

CHIEF COMPLAINT:

NAMf:

HARDY, LYNN F .
HOSP. NO.

0AT€ AOMITTEO:

1-5-74

OATS OISCHARGEO:

1-15*74

Chest pain*

PRESENT ILLNESS:
Thia 34 year old truck driver was reportedly well until the past
week when he had suffered from "flu" (muscle aching and fatigue). The afternoon of admission the patient developed a pressure-like anterior chest pain which radiated around
both sides and down both arms. He was left a constant dull pain over the anterior chest,
which was exacerbated by deep breathing. He was brought to the emergency room, where a
cardiogram revealed significant ventricular premature beats and he was admitted to the
Coronary Care unit to rule out a myocardial infarction.
Positive findings on physical examination were absent. Patient
was a slender young appearing male in no apparent distress.
B.p. 140/90, pulse 68 per minute and regular.
Clear to PSA.
Regular with apparent murmur nor gallop.

VITAL SIGNS;
LUNGS:
HEART:

LABORATORY DATA: Fasting triglyceride 165. Electrolytes were entirely WNL. Serial
enzymes revealed a CPK that was elevated to a high of 530 on the second day and graduall
subsided. SCOT on admission 159, went as high as
On admission LDH as 150 with aa
high aa 525 gradually returned to normal. SGOT on admission was 21, elevated to as high
of 130 and gradually subsided. Hgb. 15.6, Hct. 48.3, WBC's 8.900 with a normal differen
ial. Urinalysis showed 3-5 RBC9s /hpf, and was otherwise negative. 12 channel showed i
cholesterol of 323, glucose 88, creatinln 1.2, BUN 12, uric acid 4.5, calcium 9.7, phosphorous 4.5, tota- protein 7.5, SGOT 104, LDH 239. Repeat bilirubin normal at 0.7.
Chest X-ray was interpreted aa normal.
HOSPITAL COURSE: Patient was admitted to Coronary Care Unit, where over the next few
days he was found to have episodic ventricular tachycardia. This was treated with IV
Xylocalne medication and subsided. He did not have what appeared to be acute changes
of a myocardial infarction on cardiogram, because of characteristic enzyme changes determined over several days, and the ventricular irritability, it was felt that he indeed hi
suffered from a mild coronary. The only abnormality detected on laboratory work was a
mild hypercholesterolemia. Patient was discharged from the CCU. on the third day, and
convalesced without difficulty on the floor. He denied any further symptoms compatible
with ischemia heart disease, nor congestive heart failure. Condition on discharge good,
DISCHARGE DIAGNOSES:

1. Arteriosclerotic heart disease with an apparent acute myocardial infarction*
2. Mild hypercholesterolemia.
3. Strong family history for early coronary death!*
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ONWOOD HtA'ITAL

D» .d Sundwalt, M.D.
Admitted 1-5-74

•
OKAL HISTORY
••

: •
Sex:
*

ly History:
•

•

!• • • •

S.M.W.D.

• •

Age
^

!

Physician:

Reg. No.

Occupation:

Health 9 i f l i v i n g , or cause of death
Note hereditary or i n f e c t i o n s diseases

ler
ler
:hers
:ers

Working Diagnosis:

•
UMMaWMmMMMH-MMMMMMMMMBMMiMi^MaM^M^^MMMMMMMMMHBMMBaiM

TORY: (including present Illness and past history)
it comp lalnt:
IIEF COMPLAINT:

Cheat pain.

Patient's father died of a coronary In his late 40 f a. Patient
has 3 brothers, two of whom have had coronaries, both in their
)989 and one of whom has had open heart surgery, unknown reason. The patient has 5 childrer
LI of whom are reportedly alive and well.
WILY HISTORY:

&ESENI ILLNESS:

This 34-year-old truck driver was reportedly well until this past
week when he developed symptoms of "flu" (muscle aching and fatigue)
tie afternoon of admission, the patient developed a pressure-like anterior chest pain which
adiated around both sides ad down both arms. He states that this was a constant, dull
sin, and was exacerbated by deep breathing. He was brought to the ER by his family, where
e was found to have some cardiac irritability, and was admitted to the CCU to rule out a
yocardlal infarction. Patient denies any associated nausea, vomiting, dyspnea,nor d£aphorc
e states he has never had a similar pain.
EVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
EUROLOGICAL:
YES:
NT:
ESPIRATOBX:
ARDIAC:
I:
U:
XTREKLTIES:
AST HISTORY:

Patient has been generally well.
Negative. J

Vision good.
Negative.
Chronic cough, secondary to smoking.
No known history of heart problems.
Good appetite. No nausea, vomiting. Bowels regular.
Negative.
Negative.
Unremarkable. Patient has been in good health except for usual'
Infectious diseases and childhood illnesses.
lab its: patient smokes 1 to 1-1/2 packs of cigarettes per day and has done for 16 years.
tenies alcohol use except for occasion,
ted i cat ions: none,
allergies: none*
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

This Is a slender, middle-aged male, appearing somewhat older
than his stated age, but lying comfortably in bed in no acute
distress.
Signed
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Form # 111
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
.Reg. No.

Physician;.

Name:

(Physical findings: Head, Neck, Chest, Cardlo-Vasular, Abdomen, Genlto-Urlnary, Skin, Bones
Joints, Glandular, NeuroptnuacuLr. Report findings completely).
General Appearance:
Weight:

T.

Present

Normal

P.

HI, Press.

Re

VITAL SIGNS:

BP 140/90*

Pulse 68/minute. REgular.

HEAD:

Nonnocephalic without evidence of injury.

EYES:

PERRLA.

EOT:

Unremarkable.

NECK:

Supple. Full ROM.

LUNGS:

There are coarse breath sounds throughout all fields on auscultation, but no dullness to percussion nor areas of consolidation.

HEART:

Regular without apparent gallop nor murmur.

Pupils somewhat miotic*

Respirations 16/minute.

E0Mfs Intact.

No venous distention.

7%

ABDOMEN:

Scaphoid, soft and nontender.

No masses nor organomegaly detect*

GENITALIA:

Normal uncircumcised male. Testicles without masses.

EXTREMITIES:

There Is chronic infectious-looking granulomata on the dorsum of
the knuckles of the hands, and Ingrained d l and dirt in the hand1
Lower extremities are free from any edema nor cyanosis. Periphe:
pulses are brisk and intact.

NEUROLOGICAL:

Grossly within normal limits.

ASSESSMENT:

1.

dth/1-6-74/1

David N. Sundwail, M.D-

Chest pain, unknown etiology.
Rule out myocardial infarction.
2. Strong family history of arteriosclerotic heart disease.
Must rule out congenital hyperlipidemia.

P 00070
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states the same contentions in nearly the same words as before.)
Rule 60 does not permit mere re-argument of a decided case.
deChabert v. Wheatley, 392 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D.V.I. 1975).
Plaintiff again spends several pages mixing up doctors
named Sundwall.

(Pi. Memo, at 2-4.)

Her persistent confusion

of Drs. Val and David Sundwall is wearing a bit thin. The only
physician who signed Hardy's Cottonwood Hospital records as his
attending physician was Dr. David Sundwall (although a University
Medical Center report three months later erroneously referred to
Dr. Val Sundwall).

(Frankel Afft., Exh. I at 00068-070, appended

as Exhibit "III" hereto.)

It is obvious that Dr. Val Sundwall

knew nothing of Hardy's heart attack; he signed a Department of
Transportation physical examination report in January, 1977—just
three years after the attack--stating that Hardy had no prior
history of heart disease.

(Pi. Memo., Appendix at 20.) He

either knew nothing of Hardy's heart attack or intentionally
falsified an official report.

(In either case, he would not have

been a plausible source of information for Prudential.)
Plaintiff next argues that Hardy "fully recovered" from
his heart attack.

Ctd. at 3-6.)

Of couse, this begs the question

Even if he had been asymptomatic, it is indisputable that he
still sufferred from life-endangering atherosclerosis.

(Memo.

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. XIV, §§6, 7.)

8
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